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Abstract
This paper presents an approach to the eﬃcient abstraction of interrupt handling in microcontroller systems.
Such systems usually operate in uncertain environments, giving rise to a high degree of nondeterminism in
the corresponding formal models, which in turn aggravates the state explosion problem. Careful handling of
nondeterminism is therefore crucial for obtaining eﬃcient model checking tools. Here, we support this goal
by developing a formal computation model and an abstraction method, called interrupt nondeterminism,
which instantiates nondeterministic values only if and when this is required by the application code. It is
shown how this symbolic technique can be integrated into our explicit CTL model checking tool [mc]square
by introducing lazy states. A lazy state consists of explicit and symbolic parts and therefore, represents
several concrete states. With regard to interrupt handling, we also give a simulation relation between the
concrete and the abstract state space, thus establishing the correctness of our technique. Furthermore, a
case study is presented in which three diﬀerent programs are used to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of our
method.
Keywords: Model checking, state space abstraction, simulation, interrupt handling
1 Introduction
Model checking is recognized by industry as a promising future tool for the analysis
of embedded software (e.g., software for microcontrollers). Early model checkers as
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SMV [4], Spin [8] and Uppaal [9] work on models described in their proprietary spec-
iﬁcation languages. Re-modeling existing systems in these proprietary formalisms
is a huge eﬀort. For existing systems, model checking of higher level programming
languages (e.g., C, C++ or Java) is the more eﬃcient approach, but when it comes
to embedded software, many problems arise when model checking C programs.
Microcontroller programs written in C usually contain direct hardware accesses
or embedded assembly statements. These constructs are not handled by existing C
code model checkers (see [16]). Moreover, C code is ﬁrst compiled into assembly
code before it is deployed to the hardware. Hence, the C code is only an intermediate
representation. The compiler could introduce errors that cannot be found in the
original source code. In assembly code all errors introduced during the complete
development process are present. Moreover, in contrast to C code, assembly code
has a clean, formal and well documented semantics. Hence, model checking of
assembly code (machine code) gets into focus of research, see [1,12,13,17,20].
However, when model checking assembly code state spaces tend to be bigger
and the analysis is no longer hardware independent. In order to tackle these prob-
lems, we have developed [mc]square 4 , which is a discrete, (mostly) explicit state,
on-the-ﬂy, Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [4] model checker. It is capable of model
checking assembly code written for certain microcontrollers (ATMEL ATmega and
Inﬁneon XC167). We did not restrict the set of supported constructs. Hence,
[mc]square can handle arbitrary assembly programs for those microcontrollers, sup-
porting both low-level features such as direct or indirect memory access and source-
level constructs such as recursion or functions. To address the disadvantage of
being hardware-dependent, we developed an extensible architecture, which is de-
scribed in [18]. To deal with the state explosion problem, we implemented diﬀerent
abstraction techniques in [mc]square. In this paper, we will show how prioritized
interrupt levels can be used to abstract away from the concrete state of the interrupt
bits of a microcontroller.
The basic idea of the abstraction technique is that in certain states of the proces-
sor, certain bits are irrelevant for the execution. These bits can be safely abstracted
away by setting them to a don’t care value, or better said to a nondeterministic
value, which we will denote by ∗. This introduces so-called lazy states. A lazy
state is a state that contains explicit and symbolic parts. As a consequence, a lazy
state no longer represents a single state, but a set of states. Therefore, [mc]square
combines explicit and symbolic techniques. This idea is used for several abstraction
techniques within [mc]square, e.g., also for delayed nondeterminism (see [15]). In
this paper, we focus on abstracting away from the speciﬁc values of the interrupt
bits.
This paper is structured as follows: We start with the presentation of related
work. Then, a basic introduction to [mc]square is given. Section 4 details nonde-
terminism for interrupts. The subsequent section presents our formal approach to
modeling microcontrollers. As an example, the model of the ATMEL ATmega16
microcontroller is detailed. It is shown that nondeterminism of interrupts induces
4 http://www-i11.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/mc_square.html
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a simulation relation between the concrete trace of the system and the abstracted,
nondeterministic traces, thus yielding an over-approximation of the real system be-
havior. However, while over-approximating the concrete behavior, it is true that
for every trace in the abstract space, there is a concrete system which will exhibit
this behavior. As interrupts depend on the behavior of an external environment
which is not under the control of the processor, this means that all errors found in
the over-approximation can in fact also be traced back to the real implementation.
After that, a case study is summarized which demonstrates the eﬀect of interrupt
nondeterminism on the state space size. In the end a conclusion is drawn and some
potential directions for future improvements are shown.
2 Related Work
Motivated by the observation that usually memory is the limiting factor in the ap-
plication of model checking, many approaches have been developed to combat the
state explosion problem (see [4] for an overview). The abstraction technique pre-
sented in this paper, Interrupt NonDeterminism, is dynamically applied at runtime.
To the best of our knowledge, no comparable approach has been developed so far
to control the eﬀect of interrupts in modeling embedded systems.
There is, however, a veriﬁcation method for concurrent systems called narrowing
which is based on a similar idea, and which is described in [14]. Here, the states and
transitions of the system are symbolically represented by terms and rewriting steps,
respectively. Terms can contain variables to abstract from details of the system
state which currently are not “interesting”, but which can later be expanded by
substitution steps if necessary. Thus, in some sense, variables correspond to the
nondeterministic values in our approach.
Another direction of work which is worth mentioning is the concept of lazy eval-
uation in functional programming languages [10], which computes a function argu-
ment only if it is accessed in the function body. Moreover the paper [3] studies the
implementation of nondeterministic choice in this setting and refers to the problem
of copying nondeterministic values, which is also the reason for over-approximation
in our model.
Symbolic simulation is another technique that is similar to the technique applied
in [mc]square. Here, symbolic values are used in place of explicit values. In our
approach parts of the states used can be symbolic, but whenever the simulator
or the model checker needs to access symbolic parts of a state, these parts are
instantiated, and hence, become explicit. All parts of a state that are not accessed
remain symbolic. In [2], a symbolic simulator is used to verify hardware systems.
Whenever an X (denoted by * in our approach) is accessed and a value is needed, new
symbolic variables are added and simulation has to be repeated. In our approach
a dynamic reﬁnement is conducted. There are some approaches combining explicit
and symbolic executions (cf. [6,22]), but these approaches employ explicit execution
and symbolic execution in parallel.
Other model checkers that handle machine languages or languages that are
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similar to machine languages are Java PathFinder (JPF ) [24], StEAM [11], and
Estes [13], all being explicit model checkers as is [mc]square. JPF accepts Java
bytecode and employs collapsing techniques for eﬃciently storing states. Our ex-
periments have shown that such methods do not pay oﬀ in the case of [mc]square
since its states have a less complex structure. Another diﬀerence is that JPF has to
deal with concurrent processes and therefore employs abstraction techniques such as
partial order reduction, which cannot be done in [mc]square. Moreover the memory
model used within JPF makes it possible to apply symmetry reduction techniques.
Again, this is not possible in [mc]square because the order of data within memory
is important. StEAM model checks bytecode for the Internet C Virtual Machine.
In this approach an existing Virtual Machine (VM) is monitored and model check-
ing is conducted on the states created by this VM. Estes model checks assembly
code for a certain processor. Similar to StEAM, it uses an existing VM (the GNU
debugger) to create the state space. In our approach, we concentrate on the cre-
ation of the state space, that is, we concentrate on the domain-speciﬁc abstractions
implemented within the simulator. We do not want to use existing simulators as
we think that signiﬁcant savings can be achieved by a tailored implementation. In
contrast to Estes we abstract from time because the state explosion observed when
temporal aspects are taken into account, i.e., real-time model checking (cf. [9]) is
performed, is too big.
3 Introduction to [mc]square
This section gives an introduction to [mc]square, which is a discrete, (mostly) ex-
plicit state, on-the-ﬂy, CTL model checker. “Mostly explicit” means that [mc]-
square uses explicit model checking algorithms, but combines them with symbolic
techniques. We call the new states that combine explicit and symbolic parts lazy
states. Whenever a symbolic part of a lazy state is accessed, the nondeterminism
is resolved automatically. [mc]square works on assembly code written for certain
microcontrollers (ATMEL ATmega and Inﬁneon XC167). More information about
[mc]square can be found in [17,18].
The process that is applied in [mc]square is depicted by Fig. 1. First, the
user inputs the program as an Executable and Linking Format (ELF) ﬁle and the
speciﬁcation as a CTL formula. If the C code is available, the user can also provide
the corresponding ﬁle. The formula is parsed and transformed into a formula object,
which is utilized by the static analyzer and the model checker component. The ELF
ﬁle is preprocessed and converted into an human readable assembly program.
Then, the static analyzer component starts inspecting the assembly program.
During this analysis, it uses information from the formula object (registers, variables
and memory locations used within the atomic propositions) to preserve validity of
the results. In the ﬁrst step of the static analysis, a Control Flow Graph (CFG) of
the assembly program is created. This CFG is inter alia used by the counterexample
generator to present counterexamples or witnesses. In the end, the static analyzer
adds annotations to the assembly program which are used by the simulator to reduce
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Figure 1. Process used in [mc]square
the size of the state space.
After that, model checking starts. First, the model checker requests the initial
state from the state space generator. It checks this state for certain parts of the
formula, and depending on the result of this check, it requests successor states of
this state. Then, it again checks these states for speciﬁc parts of the formula. This
process continues until a goal state is reached (proving or disproving the validity
of the formula) or the complete state space is built. The model checking algorithm
used is taken from [7]. A ﬁrst version of this algorithm was presented in [23].
Whenever successors of a state are requested that are not created yet, the state
space generator uses the simulator to on-the-ﬂy create the needed states. To do
so, it passes the current state to the simulator and calls a step() method. The
simulator creates all possible successors of this state including, e.g., occurrences of
interrupts, diﬀerent input values from the environment etc. If, e.g., an instruction
IN R18 PINA reads input from the environment into register R18, then all possible
values might occur, which results in 256 successors states (all values between 0
and 255). Also, if a speciﬁc interrupt is enabled in a state of the system, then
the interrupt might potentially occur, and thus both successor states – one taking
the interrupt, one with the usual program execution step – must be considered by
[mc]square.
As the last step of analysis, the counterexample generator derives a counterex-
ample or a witness depending on the formula checked and the result of the model
checking process. This counterexample/witness is then presented in the assembly
code, in the C code, as a state space graph, or in the CFG of the assembly code.
Hence, the user can choose the representation that suits his requirements best to
ﬁnd the error. As some abstraction techniques used in [mc]square only preserve
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i0 i1 i2 i3
source active + + + +
interrupt enabled + + - +
interrupt ﬂag * * * *
Table 1
Four interrupts exemplifying nondeterministic interrupts.
ACTL 5 , the user can use this representation to check whether a witness of an
non-ACTL formula is a feasible one.
During state space building [mc]square uses diﬀerent abstraction techniques to
minimize the size of the state space. It is important to notice that all these abstrac-
tions lead to a safe over-approximation of the concrete state space, establishing a
simulation relation between the concrete and the abstract states (and thus preserv-
ing the validity of ACTL formulae). One of these abstraction techniques is interrupt
nondeterminism, which is detailed in this paper.
4 Interrupt Nondeterminism
Interrupt nondeterminism abstracts away from interrupts which are below the cur-
rent interrupt level to reduce the state space for interrupt handling. Whenever an
interrupt at level  is taken, all interrupt ﬂags for levels below  can be set to the
nondeterministic value ∗. When not using the abstraction, there are 2s diﬀerent
possible combinations where s is the number of active interrupt sources. Abstrac-
tion reduces this number to a− 1 where a ≤ s is the number of enabled interrupts,
which yields a drastical saving in terms of successor states.
However, even when interrupts are disabled or masked, it still is possible to check
their values, or enable them again. In this cases, the analysis again must consider
the actual values of the interrupt bits. Thus, we need to consider that interrupt bits
are tested or set, and then make their value explicit again. This step is called the
instantiation of a bit, and can occur in two ways: if the bit is tested, the simulation
needs to take both cases into account: that its value is 0 or 1. Two successor states
must be created, one for each possibility – or even more, if several bits are tested
in parallel. If the bit is set to a speciﬁc value, then the bit is just set to this value
in the successor state.
In Tab. 1 an example conﬁguration of four interrupts is shown. The sources of
all four interrupts are active, but only three of these interrupts are enabled. In a
concrete simulation, all 16 value combinations shown in the left part of Tab. 2 are
written to the interrupts ﬂag registers. In contrast, only 4 combinations are written
to the interrupt ﬂag registers when using interrupt nondeterminism. These four
combinations are shown in the right part of Tab. 2.
Note that if an interrupt bit occurs in the formula tested by the model checker,
then that bit must be excluded from interrupt nondeterminism. This is a simple
implementation issue not detailed in this paper.
5 the universal fragment of CTL; see [5]
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i0 i1 i2 i3
0 0 0 0 → no interrupt
0 0 0 1 → interrupt 3
0 0 1 0 → no interrupt
0 0 1 1 → interrupt 3
0 1 0 0 → interrupt 1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 1 1 0 → interrupt 0
1 1 1 1 → interrupt 0
i0 i1 i2 i3
1 * * * → interrupt 0
0 1 * * → interrupt 1
0 0 * 1 → interrupt 3
0 0 * 0 → no interrupt
Table 2
Deterministic and nondeterministic evaluation of interrupts.
Here, we described handling of interrupts using a static interrupt priority table
for the ATMEL ATmega microcontrollers. Nondeterministic interrupts also work
using a dynamic interrupt priority table because at the time of interrupt handling,
the priorities are ﬁxed as the interrupt table can only be changed by instructions.
Moreover whenever interrupts are handled, no instruction is executed at that mo-
ment.
5 The Formal Model
Delayed nondeterminism (DND) has been presented in [15] ﬁrst, where it is proved
that DND preserves a simulation relation. Here, we show that the restriction of this
technique to interrupt handling, interrupt nondeterminism, also preserves simula-
tion. Thus it is sound with respect to “path-universal” logics such as ACTL.
5.1 Basics of the Model
Our formal proof for the correctness of the nondeterministic approximation of inter-
rupt handling uses a formal model deﬁning the behavior of our system by a semantic
function. The intuition behind the formal model is described in the section.
The model works on the following basic data types:
• the basic data in the model are bits B := {0, 1} and bytes C := B8,
• to model nondeterminism, we use the “don’t care” bit ∗, and extend the set of
bits by this value: B∗ := B ∪ {∗}, and similarly C∗ := B
8
∗
.
The microcontroller consists of a control and a data space:
• The data space is modeled by an ordered set of addresses A, and an association
of (nondeterministic) byte values to these addresses v : A → C∗. Here we assume
w.l.o.g. that each address comprises m bytes, that is, A = {0, . . . , 28m − 1}. The
set of all data spaces is denoted by V .
• As we often need to select speciﬁc bits from bytes, we use Abit := A× {0, . . . , 7}
as the address space for bits, and then interpret v as v : Abit → B∗, where
v(a) = v(a, 7) . . . v(a, 0).
• The control (code) space is modeled by a set of locations Q, which is a linearly
ordered set, and a mapping of the locations to instructions Ins. More details on
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instructions can be found below.
The above model is a straightforward implementation of a Harvard Computer,
where we allow certain bits to be nondeterministic in the model, i.e., in a speciﬁc
snapshot we do not know the status of certain bits.
We will now deﬁne a transition relation, which describes the behavior of this
machine. The basic idea is that the machine cycles through instructions, and that
each instruction deﬁnes the read- and write accesses to the memory as well as the
control location of the next instruction (which is the following location in the normal
case, but a diﬀerent one in case of jumps).
The machine we describe is used to control some environment. The communica-
tion with the environment happens via ports, which are lines sending bits into the
environment or receiving bits from the environment. We assume the usual memory-
mapped I/O, so the ports are special addresses within the memory of the machine.
The setting of the input ports is described by an environment speciﬁcation env,
which is a sequence of guarded assignments to the ports. The guarded assignments
are executed each time before an instruction is carried out.
Further, the machine has a set of interrupt routines. The interrupt routines are
described by the interrupt handler IH, which is a sequence of guarded assignments,
where each guarded assignment has a continuation, i.e. a location to which the ma-
chine will jump when the interrupt routines are triggered. The guarded assignments
describe the interrupt logic of the machine: the guard speciﬁes when the interrupt is
taken (e.g. when a certain interrupt is enabled and the interrupt ﬂag is set) and the
assignments model the interrupt logic, e.g. storing of the current program counter
on the system stack happens here. Further, the interrupt routines are prioritized,
i.e. they are executed in a speciﬁc order from highest to lowest priority, and the
routine with the highest priority and an enabled guard is executed ﬁrst.
The interrupt handler is executed after the environment speciﬁcation and before
the respective instruction. This way, a synchronized, clock-cycle triggered execution
of the machine is guaranteed.
We now deﬁne the syntax and semantics of assignments, guards and expressions.
An assignment takes the form x ← e, where x is an address expression and e is a
value expression. Let Z bet the set of all assignments.
For address expressions, we have x ::= a | a↓ + d | a[b] where a ∈ A, b ∈
{0, . . . , 7}, and d ∈ Z. The ﬁrst case is a direct byte access, the second is an indirect
byte access with displacement d, the third is accessing the bth bit at address a. Let
X be the set of all address expressions.
A value expression is either an address expression, or an operation on value
expressions e ::= op(e1, . . . , en). Possible domains are B and C both for argument
and result. Let E be the set of all value expressions.
A guard is a test on the equality of two value expressions, boolean combina-
tions thereof or negation: g ::= e1 == e2 | g1 ∧ g2 | g1 ∨ g2 | ¬g1, where ei are value
expressions and the gi are guards. Let G be the set of all guards.
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5.2 Semantics in the Deterministic Case
We can now give a semantics for the behavior of the microcontroller for the deter-
ministic case.
The semantics e : V → C∪B of a value expression is deﬁned by a(v) := v(a),
a↓+ d(v) := v(a′ + d) where a′ denotes the address which is referred to by the m
bytes stored at a: a′ := v(a) · 28(m−1) + . . . + v(a +m− 1) ∈ A, a[b](v) := v(a, b),
and op(e1, . . . , en)(v) = op(e1(v), . . . , en(v)).
Let v{a/e} be the valuation v′ where v′(a) = e and v′(a′) = v(a′) else. Then
assignments have the semantics x ← e : V → V where a ← e(v) = v{a/e(v)},
a↓+d ← e(v) = v{a′+d/e(v)} where again a′ := v(a)·28(m−1)+. . .+v(a+m−1),
and a[b]← e(v) = v{(a, b)/e(v)} (assuming type correctness).
Guards have type g : V → B, and are deﬁned as e1 == e2(v) = 0 if e1(v)
not equal e2(v), and e1 == e2(v) = 1 else. The boolean operators work as usual:
g1 ∧ g2(v) = g1(v) ∧ g2(v) etc.
On sets, we use the usual operations ∗ and + meaning all ﬁnite sequences resp.
all non-empty ﬁnite sequences. Let GA := G×Z∗ be the set of guarded assignments,
and GAC := GA×Q the set of guarded assignments with a continuation.
A guarded assignment is enabled when its guard is 1. The semantics of an
enabled guard assignment is the execution of the assignment, otherwise the guard
assignment does not change the microcontroller’s memory. Formally,
g : asn(v) =
{
v if g(v) = 0
asn(v) if g(v) = 1
The Environment handler env ∈ GA+ has the form g1 : asn1; ... ; gn : asnn. Its
semantics is the consecutive execution of the enabled assignments:
g1 : asn1; ... ; gn : asnn(v) = gn : asnn(g1 : asn1; ... ; gn−1 : asnn−1(v)), n ≥ 2
A guarded assignment with continuation induces a mapping . : Q×V → Q×V ,
deﬁned as
g : asn, q′(q, v) =
{
(q, v) if g(v) = 0
(q′, asn(v)) if g(v) = 1
The interrupt handler IH ∈ GAC+ has the form IH = g1 : asn1, q1 > ... > gn :
asnn, qn. We say that an interrupt is triggered if its guard is enabled. The function
trigger : GAC+ → N deﬁnes which interrupt is taken:
trigger(IH) =
{
0 if ∀i.gi(v) = 0,
j if gj(v) = 1,∀i < j.gi(v) = 0
and then IH(v) = gj : asnj, qj(q, v) if trigger(IH) = j.
The instruction handler Ins ∈ Q × GAC+ has the form q :: g1 : asn1, q1 >
... > gn : asnn, qn, and will also execute the ﬁrst enabled assignment:
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q :: g1 : asn1, q1 > ... > gn : asnn, qn(v) :=
g1 : asn1, q1 > ... > gn : asnn, qn(q, v)
The microcontroller MC is then the tuple (A,Q, Ins, env, IH, q0, v0) with start
state q0 ∈ Q and initial memory v0 ∈ V . It deﬁnes a transition relation on Q× V
by (q, v) → (q′, v′) with v1 = env(v),
(q′, v′) =
{
IH(q, v1) if trigger(v1) > 0
Ins(q, v1) if trigger(v1) = 0
and initial state (q0, v0). We will call this behavior of MC the concrete behavior.
5.3 Nondeterministic Interrupts
When modeling all possible behaviors of an environment, we would need to take
into account all possible settings of the interrupt bits at any time. However, when
an interrupt of level  is taken, the lower prioritized interrupts are not important
anymore. Thus we can reduce the number of states in the model checker by replacing
all interrupt bits with a lower priority by the nondeterministic bit ∗.
To formalize this, we now introduce the nondeterministic transition relation
→nd. This will be done by lifting the deterministic transition relation to nondeter-
ministic evaluations v : A → C∗.
We start with introducing nondeterminism into our model, using the function
ndet : (Abit → B∗)× 2
Abit → (Abit → B∗), which increases the level of nondetermin-
ism:
ndet(M,v) := w where w(a, b) :=
{
v(a, b) if (a, b) ∈ M
∗ if (a, b) ∈ M
Assume we have interrupt levels 1, . . . , n. Then we have also a set of interrupt
bits IB1, . . . , IBn ∈ Abit. Let IL() := {IB1, . . . , IB−1}. Let IH be some interrupt
handler with IH(q, v) = (q, v′) in the deterministic case. Then IHnd(q, v) :=
(q′,ndet(IL(), v′) in the nondeterministic case, if trigger(IH) =  > 0, and thus
interrupt nondeterminism is introduced into the model at this point.
The next step is to lift the semantics of expressions, assignments and guards to
nondeterministic valuations, where all bits which are important for the evaluation
are still deterministic. To formalize this notion, we deﬁned the set of bits which are
read in an expression, assignment, resp. guard. Let tested : A ∪ E ∪ Z ∪G → 2Abit
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be deﬁned as
tested(a) := {(a, 0), . . . , (a, 7)}
tested(a↓+ d) := tested(a) ∪ tested(v(a))
tested(a[b]) := {(a, b)}
tested(op(e1, . . . , en)) := tested(e1) ∪ . . . ∪ tested(en)
tested(a ← e) := tested(e)
tested(e1 == e2) := tested(e1) ∪ tested(e2)
tested(e1 ∧ e2) := tested(e1) ∪ tested(e2)
tested(e1 ∨ e2) := tested(e1) ∪ tested(e2)
tested(¬e) := tested(e)
Obviously, only the bits in tested(e) are needed to evaluate the expression e
for some valuation v. So for valuations v which are deterministic in tested(e), the
above deﬁnitions can be re-used without changes. Let →x be the transition relation
induced by this.
Now for a valuation which is nondeterministic in bits needed for evaluation, we
will simply instantiate the necessary bits to all possible values. This is formalized by
the function: det : 2Abit × (Abit → B∗) → 2
(Abit→B∗), which is capable of decreasing
the nondeterminism of a valuation:
det(M,w) := {v ∈ Abit → B∗ | ∀(a, b) ∈ M.v(a, b) = ∗ and
∀(a, b) ∈ Abit.w(a, b) = ∗ =⇒ v(a, b) = w(a, b)}.
Further, nb(w) is the set of nondeterministic bits in w, i.e.
nb(w) := {(a, b) |w(a, b) = ∗}.
Now a semantic function φ with e(v) = v′ can be extended to a nondetermin-
istic valuation w by setting end(w) := {e(v) | v ∈ det(M,w)},M = tested(e) ∩
nb(w), and similarly end(q, w) := {e(q, v) | v ∈ det(M,w)}. Note that our se-
mantics now yields a set of valuations as result.
The nondeterministic transition function can then be deﬁned as (q, w) →nd
(q′, w′) iﬀ (q′, w′) ∈ MCnd(q, w).
Note that we can lift the deﬁnition of tested to the transition relation by the
following rules, yielding a notion of tested for our transition relation.
• For consecutive execution of statements, the tested sets need to be joined,
• for statements with priority, only take into account the statements until the ﬁrst
executed.
So whenever we have a deterministic transition (q, v) → (q′, v′), there is a set
M ⊆ Abit of the bits referred to by the transition. For all N ⊆ Abit\M , the valuation
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wˆ := ndet(N, v) has all the necessary information for the deterministic relation, and
thus we can also apply the deﬁnition, yielding a transition (q, wˆ)→x (q
′, vˆ). As this
transition results from reading and writing the same bits as for (q, v) → (q′, v′), there
must be N ′ ⊆ N and vˆ = ndet(N ′, v′). It must not be N = N ′, as nondeterministic
bits can be assigned a value by the transition.
5.4 Modeling the ATMEL ATmega16
Now we will show how to use the general framework to model the ATMEL AT-
mega16 microcontroller. The ATMEL ATmega16 has a 16K ﬂash memory for pro-
gram code, which corresponds to the location set Q. All special purpose register
of the ATMEL are embedded into the data space, which has an address length of
m := 2. As we focus on interrupt handling here, we will brieﬂy describe the inter-
rupt handling of the ATMEL and identify the special purpose registers within A
that are essential for the interrupt handling.
The ATMEL has 21 diﬀerent interrupts, each on an interrupt level of its own.
The interrupts range over a non-maskable reset, externally generated interrupts,
timer interrupts and internally generated interrupts caused, e.g., by completion of
speciﬁc operations.
Each interrupt apart from the non-maskable reset can only occur when at least
three conditions are met:
• interrupts are globally enabled, i.e., the global interrupt enable ﬂag I in the status
register SREG must be set,
• the enable interrupt bit of the speciﬁc interrupt must be set,
• the interrupt ﬂag of the speciﬁc interrupt must be set.
The enable interrupt bit and the interrupt ﬂag are found in diﬀerent registers
depending on the type of the interrupt. For timer interrupts, they are stored in the
TIMSK and TIFR registers, for external interrupts in the GICR and the GIFR registers,
and similar for the rest of the interrupts.
In order to model check real systems, where we have no control over the environ-
ment of our microcontroller, we must assume that input ports can have any value,
and that interrupts might occur at any time.
This is done by introducing nondeterminism for certain bits in our storage,
namely for the input port bits of our system and the interrupt ﬂags. The environ-
ment env is used to set these bits to ∗ before an instruction is carried out. Due
to space limitations, we cannot give the full deﬁnition of the environment for the
ATMEL, but we will illustrate it by an example with one of the built-in timers and
with one of the external interrupts.
For the example, we use the function nd : B∗ → B∗ deﬁned as nd(0) := ∗, nd(1) =
1, nd(∗) = ∗. If an interrupt ﬂag is already set, then this function leaves it set. If
the interrupt ﬂag is not set, or nondeterministic, then it could be set in this step,
and thus must be made nondeterministic.
A timer interrupt for Timer 0 can only occur if the clock for Timer 0 is selected.
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The mode of the timer is set via the CS02/CS01/CS00 bits of the TCCR0 register.
The external interrupt 2 can only occur if a certain port is selected as the source
for this interrupt. The port’s setting is controlled via bit DDB in the port register
DDRB. Thus we have:
TCCR0[CS02] == 1 ∨ TCCR0[CS01] == 1 ∨ TCCR0[CS00] == 1 :
TIFR[TOV0] ← nd(TIFR[TOV0]);
DDRB[DDB2] == 0 : GIFR[INTF2]← nd(GIFR[INTF2]); . . .
As said before, the interrupt only occurs if the global interrupt enable bit in the
status register, the bit in the interrupt mask and the interrupt ﬂag are set. The
following interrupt handler checks this ﬁrst for the timer interrupt, then for the
external interrupt.
SREG[I] = 1 ∧ TIMSK[TOIE0] = 1 ∧ TIFR[TOV0] = 1 :, 18↓ >
SREG[I] = 1 ∧ GICR[INT2] = 1 ∧ GIFR[INTF2] = 1 :, 36↓ > . . .
As can be seen, interrupt vectors are stored at memory locations 18 and 36 respec-
tively, and the interrupt at 18 has priority over the other one.
5.5 The Simulation Proof
In order to reduce the eﬀort in model checking which comes from introducing non-
determinism, we will show that for the interrupts, it is safe to make all interrupt bits
below the current interrupt level nondeterministic. Assuming three interrupt levels
stored in the lower three bits of the interrupt register, this means we can identify
all states where these bits have the values 100, 110, 101, 111, which is a reduction of
a factor 4 for the interrupt handling. In the general, we gain a factor or 2n for n
interrupt levels, so for the ATMEL we gain a factor of up to 220.
To show this, we look at a ﬁxed microcontroller MC = (A,Q, Ins, env, IH, q0, v0).
The interrupt handler and the environment handler are deﬁned as sketched above,
thus implementing the interrupt handling model of the ATMEL. The instruction
space can hold an arbitrary program.
This MC induces a deterministic transition system → and a nondeterministic
transition system →nd . Intuition tells us that the deterministic transition system
is the real behavior of the microprocessor when running the loaded program, and
if the environment behaves as modeled. The nondeterministic transition system in
contrast models how the simulation of the processor is implemented in [mc]square.
To show that the nondeterministic transition system is similar to the determinis-
tic one, formally we show that there is a simulation relation ≤σ: (Q×V )×(Q×Vnd)
such that whenever s ≤σ snd and s → s
′, then there is s′nd such that snd →nd s
′
nd
and s′ ≤σ s
′
nd.
The relation for which we show the result is just relating states which are more
nondeterministic, i.e. for which there is a set M ⊆ Abit such that w = ndet(M,v).
For those we claim that (q, v) ≤σ (q, w) is a simulation of (q, w) by (q, v).
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So assume we have (q, v) → (q′, v′). Further let M such that w = ndet(M,v). If
there is no interrupt involved, then we have (q, w) →nd (q
′, w′) for some M,N with
w = ndet(M,v), w′ = ndet(N, v′). By deﬁnition of ≤σ, we have (q
′, v′) ≤σ (q
′, w′).
If an interrupt at level  occurs, then we have (q, w) →nd (q
′, w′) for some M,N
with w = ndet(M,v), w′ = ndet(IL(),ndet(N, v′)). Again, obviously we also have
(q′, v′) ≤σ (q
′, w′).
So nondeterministic interrupts are an overapproximation of the concrete system,
simulating all behaviours of the concrete system. Additionally, as any value for an
interrupt can occur at any time, it is also clear that all states reachable in the
nondeterministic system are reachable in the deterministic system.
6 Case Study
This case study was ﬁrst described in [15]. Here, we summarize the important
details and reconsider the results under the aspect of DND for interrupts. In [15]
only DND for values was considered. DND for interrupts was activated in all runs.
The case study was conducted on a laptop equipped with a Intel Core Duo CPU
at 2.33 GHz, 4 GB main memory, and a hard disk with a capacity of 100 GB.
[mc]square is completely written in Java, and hence, every operating system can
be used. All programs used in this case study were developed by students during
lab courses, exercises, diploma theses, or their working time. None of these pro-
grams was intentionally written to be model checked. All programs were run on
the ATMEL ATmega16 microcontroller. Details about this case study can be found
in [15].
As DND for interrupts cannot be deactivated in [mc]square because its operation
is essential for the model checking of programs using interrupts, we can only show
the diﬀerences obtained by DND of values. These three programs all use interrupts.
Without using DND for interrupts the number of states would be considerably
higher and model checking of these programs would not be possible.
Table 3 presents the outcome of this case study for the three programs. The
ﬁrst column shows the name of the program. In the second column it is indicated
which abstraction techniques were used (here: DND for interrupts only, DND for
interrupts and for values, and all abstraction techniques). The option all abstraction
techniques includes DND, path reduction, and dead variable reduction. The column
# states stored represents the number of diﬀerent states stored in the state space.
In contrast, the column # states created shows the number of all states created
during building of the state space, including revisits. Size [MB] gives the size of the
state space in main memory, and Time [s] shows the total time needed for building
the state space including all preparatory steps (e.g., preprocessing, parsing, and
static analyses) and model checking the formula AG true. We chose this formula
because it builds the complete state space, and it does not inﬂuence the abstraction
techniques. In case a formula is chosen that makes an assumption about a certain
memory location (e.g., register, I/O register, or variable), the abstraction techniques
would no longer work on this memory location. As the formulas are diﬀerent for
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Program Options # states # states Size Time
used stored created [MB] [s]
plant
DND IR 801,616 854,203 240 23.19
DND 188,404 195,955 57 4.39
all 11,524 222,636 3.5 3.02
traﬃc light
DND IR 35,613 38,198 10 0.78
DND 10,004 10,520 2.73 0.24
all 523 13,069 0.21 0.17
window lift
DND IR 10,100,400 11,196,174 2,049 416.98
DND 323,450 444,191 96 9.09
all 10,699 463,129 3.26 7.43
Table 3
Eﬀect of delayed nondeterminism on the state space size.
each program, the inﬂuence on each program would be diﬀerent. Therefore, a fair
comparison of the state space sizes and the eﬀect of the abstraction techniques
would not be possible.
We can give some comments about the size of the state space when not using
DND of interrupts. When using DND for interrupts, only enabled interrupts are
ﬁred by writing only possible value combinations into the ﬂag registers. When not
using DND for interrupts, all interrupts would be ﬁred that have an active interrupt
source by writing all value combinations into the ﬂag registers.
The plant program consists of 225 lines of assembly code and uses two interrupts
and one timer. The traﬃc light consists of 155 lines of assembly code and uses the
same number of timers and interrupts as the plant program. The window lift has
289 lines of assembly code and uses again two interrupts and one timer. As all
program use the same number of timers and interrupts, we only detail one of them.
The plant program uses one timer interrupt and one external interrupt. When
using DND for interrupts, at most three combinations are written to the ﬂag reg-
isters: timer interrupt occurred, external interrupt occurred, and no interrupt oc-
curred. This is only done when the corresponding interrupts are enabled. When not
using DND for interrupts more combination are written. In this case all interrupts
are ﬁred that have an active interrupt source. The interrupt source for the timer
used in the plant program is actually the source for two diﬀerent timer interrupts.
The second timer interrupt is not used in this program but without using DND
for interrupts, it would be ﬁred. As all value combinations are written into the
ﬂag registers, at least nine combinations would be written. These nine combination
would be created in every line of the program where the sources of the interrupts are
active. The sources are active in almost all parts of the program including interrupt
routines (in interrupt routines, other interrupts are usually deactivated). If nonde-
terminism of values is involved (e.g., input from the environment) additionally, the
number of resulting states from these values would be multiplied with the number
of interrupt value combinations. The same notes apply for the program traﬃc light
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and window lift.
DND has a major inﬂuence on the size of the state spaces. The inﬂuence of DND
for values can be seen in Tab. 3 and is described in [15]. The inﬂuence of DND for
interrupts cannot be seen in the table. Before we implemented DND for interrupts,
we could hardly check a program using more than one interrupt. Now, we can
usually check programs with up to ﬁve interrupts. DND for interrupts typically has
a bigger inﬂuence on the size of the state space than DND for values has. In the
previous paragraph, we gave an impression about the sizes of state spaces of these
three programs when not using DND. [21] presents a case study where we model
checked microcontroller programs, which were used to do a speed measuring for a
model car. These programs used up to 5 interrupts and had up to 5000 lines of
assembly code. Without using DND, [mc]square was not able to model check these
programs. Using DND it was possible to model check them.
7 Conclusion & Future Work
In this paper delayed nondeterminism for interrupts, which is an abstraction tech-
nique implemented in [mc]square, was detailed and it was proven that DND for
interrupts preserves a simulation relation. This is an important result as DND for
interrupts cannot be deactivated by the user because this abstraction technique is
too essential for [mc]square. Without this abstraction techniques, even small pro-
grams using more than one interrupt could not be model checked. As [mc]square
is a CTL model checker, simulation is needed to preserve the validity of formulas.
The DND of values preserves a simulation relation (see [15]) and hence, the validity
of ACTL formulas is preserved. Nevertheless, DND of values can be deactivated by
the user if the over-approximation is too coarse.
DND is an abstraction technique that introduces lazy states into [mc]square. A
lazy state is a state that is mostly explicit but has symbolic parts. These symbolic
parts remain symbolic until they are required in a computation. The moment they
are required, they are lazily instantiated. Thereby, the approach used in [mc]square
is no longer completely explicit but partly explicit and partly symbolic. DND has a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the size of state spaces. Without this abstraction technique,
[mc]square could not model check most programs it can check using DND. As seen
in Sect. 6 DND can be used together with other abstraction techniques implemented
in [mc]square.
In the future, we want to investigate if we can establish a bisimulation relation
for DND for values. The copying of values destroys the bisimulation relation. If we
introduce instances of nondeterminism and copy these instances, instantiation such
an instance would have an eﬀect on all the instances and preserve the bisimulation.
However, we have to observe the eﬀects on the size of the state space and the number
of diﬀerent nondeterminism instances. Another thing that we want to implement
is a model checking algorithm for a three-valued logic. This would make it possible
to make propositions about registers used within the DND abstraction technique.
Summarizing, we think that this is a promising approach to analyze software
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for embedded systems. [mc]square can already handle programs of interesting size.
Delayed nondeterminism is an abstraction technique that helps to tackle the state
explosion problem. It can be combined with other techniques implemented in [mc]-
square (e.g., path reduction and dead variable reduction). This technique can also
be used for model checking software for many other microcontrollers. As we have
experienced with delayed nondeterminism or path reduction (cf. [19]), there are
abstraction techniques which perform better when model checking assembly code.
Hence, we will focus future research on domain speciﬁc abstraction techniques.
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